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Methods, methodology and mapping

Draft model, as phenomenology.
The Environmental Studies Association of Canada posted a call for papers in 2013 (http://esac.ca/2013/10/call-for-papers-btttt-weather/) with the title, DOING PHENOMENOLOGY: BACK TO THE THINGS THEMSELVES! In short, they wanted papers that met these qualifications.
1. A detailed, rigorous, extended and original description of a phenomenon in the lived world.
2. An explication of the method used to generate this description.
In detailing the second point, they note that
the goal should be to show the audience how a description was generated. Explications of method should be stated in broad terms, and overly-detailed textual exegesis should be relegated to footnotes or appendices in order to preserve the "flow" of a description. We are interested in how our panelists have learned from, applied, adjusted, merged, questioned, subverted or otherwise deployed a variety of phenomenological methods in the development of their own phenomenological practice.
This is an admission that phenomenological practice, the specific methods used at least, not the general methodology, is not standard. With this in mind, both the methodology and the methods used for phenomenological description need to be outlined in such a way or ways that those of writing can be compared and mapped to see if there is some fit.

This call for papers also highlights that the description (artifact, product, writing) grows out of a process of textual inquiry, suggesting that it is turtles all the way up and all the way down. But it is one turtle that is of paramount importance as a claim to the description of a phenomenon. But the source text(s) give evidence of a phenomenon, no?

Just a note here. The call for papers assumes that it will receive academic-like papers which are descriptions. The contention here is that these are not the only legitimate descriptions, but that each and every piece of writing, all the way up and all the way down, qualifies as doing or having done phenomenology, a hypothesis yet to be tested.

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