Producing a phenomenological descriptive analysis

direct-experience ("re-creation") or about-experiencing ("report")

DRAFT

Background

The following is a writing and research process I used for a study  some years ago. It is an example of qualitative research, grounded in phenomenology and hermeneutics, which, if the specific dialectic-iterative method is used, the result will be a phenomenological description of (a slice of) human experience.

(Or will it produce just another piece of writing? Jury to convene on this matter later.)

The process and product are academic and verbal in nature. This does not exclude other representations of doing phenomenology. For example, one could consider a work of art or a piece of music as providing the structure and essence of a phenomenon, in addition to being a phenomenon in and of itself. These non-verbal practices of seeing what is and understanding same are not addressed here.

Sources are noted throughout with a short list of references at the end. Terms characteristic of the philosophy and methodology of both hermeneutics and phenomenology are noted in italics (_term here_). This to demonstrate that this writing and research process is grounded in the accepted culture and traditions of the two fields of knowledge and inquiry.

A hermeneutic phenomenology

Phenomenology _reduces_ human experience from one or more claimed  accounts by identifying and elaborating that experience's qualities and features. A hermeneutic stance with respect to an account discloses its expressed meaning. A hermeneutic phenomenology then is intended to produce a synthetic description, or what it is most like to experience that which is. The _intentional object held in consciousness_ can be seen for what and how it is in fullness.

A hermeneutic phenomenology, as a phrase used here, rests on two traditions in _phenomenology_, that of describing _essences_, or _eidetic_ phenomenology (e.g., Husserl, 1931/1962), and that of understanding meanings, or _hermeneutics_ (e.g., Palmer, 1969). A precedent for a combination of the two traditions is contained, for example, in the work of Ricoeur (1981/1995; see also Ray, 1994). The specific methods outlined here are based on the work of Moustakas (1994), van Manen (1984, 1990), and Ihde (1986). The particular approach and the procedures followed conform to those outlined by Mishler (1990) and Wertz (1983) for interpretive inquiry.

Data sources

A personal, non-fiction account of experiencing something already describes that human experience. It either recounts it for the reader/audience to re-create the experience, or it is _about_ experiencing the phenomenon. If the former, how one re-experiences that phenomenon second-hand, this is yet another account which can be used to understand the object (focus) of inner _intentional_ gaze. To move beyond individual cases, especially second-hand ones, and see a phenomenon across presumed instances requires more than one account of one type and the other.

[See previous post for schematic of a hermeneutic phenomenology.]

Overview

Each statement within each account is considered as possibly relevant in giving evidence of the phenomenon (Filmer, Phillipson, Silverman, and Walsh, 1973, p. 129). To consider each statement for what it reveals requires that all personal, taken-for-granted, and explanatory ways of seeing the phenomenon be set aside (Husserl, 1931/1962). Through this _bracketing_ or _epoche_, one notes those statements that are _invariant_ to the _boundaries_ of the phenomenon and can classify them into themes.

The themes then guide writing textural and structural descriptions for each account. As a check against the accuracy and consistency of the descriptions, the _themes_ become a working matrix to apply back against the accounts. The result is "a sense of fulfillment" (Moustakas, 1994, p. 78) of what is and is not the phenomenon, the more definite boundaries. The matrix applied reiteratively helps to create a taxonomy of qualities and features.

Moustakas (1994, pp. 131-132) and van Manen (1984, p. 59) referred to themes as _structure_ and processes of experience. Themes (and clusters) here are first-order indicators of what become qualities and features (respectively, texture and structure _and_ dynamics). The difference lies in distinctions within and among levels of _reduction_ (abstraction).

The taxonomy guides how the phenomenon in its fullness can be illustrated as well as fixes the contents of composite descriptions. Composite textural and structural descriptions, signifying respectively what and how one experience the phenomenon, although these two are difficult to separate entirely (Moustakas, 1994, pp. 78-79). Both of these form the basis of a _textural-structural description_. That description of the experience of the (now more carefully named) phenomenon is possible once a point of coherence and completeness through considering and reconsidering the above, especially the accounts themselves (Husserl, 1950/1995, p. 13), in a circular or _spiral_-like process of understanding (e.g., Gadamer, 1988).

Qualified epoche

Van Manen (1984, p. 40) discussed the nature of phenomenological inquiry as originating in the inquirer. Including one's own account and _reflections_ on it responds to this as well as inter-subjective understanding--communicating the nature and significance of the object of the phenomenon through a _phenomenological description_.

I articulate what preconceptions and assumptions I bring to the inquiry in two ways. One is an initial identification of what I am conscious of as I embark on the interpretive journey. (I acknowledge here that a journey itself is a preconception replete with its own baggage of connotations.) The other is my own account and reflections. They, in a palpable sense for me, are my biases. Both of these, the initial identification and my own account and reflections, I acknowledge in the inquiry.

Setting aside biases prior to data collection and analysis, as is conventional in some phenomenological approaches (see Cohen & Omery, 1994), is not part of the epoche process here. Articulating, holding at bay, and eventually honoring my own participation in the inquiry have its precedents, for example, in Moustakas (1994) and Paget (1983).

I can also discover what I bring to the inquiry in the process of holding in consciousness the experience and experiencing that the accounts of others reveal. My biases will invade my attempt to discover what is. The object is to try not to impose some projection of my own, or one that I have adopted from looking into the subject of the phenomenon to begin with. To process those external-to-the-phenomenon interpretations as they occur will help set the fundamental phenomenon off from solely my experiences and thoughts.

Beginning interpretation

After setting my own preconceptions off to one side, I place each text into a table where the basic units of meaning are sentences (Ricoeur, 1981/1995, p. 148; Strauss & Corbin, 1990). The table allows easy coding. The coding has three parts: 1) which statements are relevant, 2) which statements are boundaries of the phenomenon, and 3) what are the apparent themes (Moustakas, 1994). The resulting coded texts become the basis for summaries of what the experience is about--to this percipient. These summaries in the form of paraphrases (Polyani, 1981) lead to fuller individual textural and structural descriptions for each account or story.

The determination of relevance hinges on whether a statement has something specific to say about the phenomenon, or phenomena among those considered. The next step is to determine the _horizons_ of the phenomenon. That is, is the statement within or outside of the boundaries of the phenomenon, for this percipient, the inquirer, and then for the instances included in this inquiry? Finally, what are the relevant and boundary-determining statements about in general and specific terms? The general terms are those one can use when talking or writing about the accounts in his or her own way of understanding them. The specific way is the terms the first person writer-percipient (of an account) uses. These terms become the _themes and theme clusters_ of the phenomenon.

Textural descriptions

The method for reducing the texts into themes is to tell how one understands them as informed reader (Gadamer, 1988, p.69). One then "narratizes" each account to detail this. "How do I hear it?" "What meaning do I make of it?" This narrative is one's interpretation of what the account _uncovers_ to experience. Etymological excursions as well as the deconstruction of idioms can be parts of the narratizing. They may reveal insights into the _lived experience_ that the account conveys (van Manen, 1984, p. 53).

This process is to let the account reveal the fullness of the experience to and through a reader/audience (Palmer, 1969, p. 248; van Manen, 1984). The description of the experience is then not just textual and reduced, but textural and full. One then might be able to sense what an instance of the phenomenon might be like as well as its core _ontological conditions_.

(By way of clarification, textual refers to text and what a text as strings of words convey. Textural is used in the sense of the feel and fabric of the experience that the text _evokes_ or reveals along with the words and word strings.)

Each account is a variation of the phenomenon based on the preconception of it and in the sense of its having its own percipient and context (see Packer, 1985, p. 1086). In addition, the inquirer's account and participation (_reflexive_) in the experience of the phenomenon constitute further variations and elaborations. Taken together, all contribute to a comprehensive textural description of the experience.

Structural descriptions

Part of epoche is to acknowledge and set aside any preliminary definition and criteria. Yet the inquiry must have some point of origin. Packer (1985) noted that the "hermeneutic inquiry begins with a preliminary and tentative pre-understanding" (p. 1090), which allows an inquiry to proceed. That point of origin can be questioned (doubted) in the process. (See also Moustakas (1994).)

The next step in _reduction_ is to construct a description of the structure and dynamics of each account.

Applying the parameters for determining whether or not an experience is a phenomenon is the first step in this process. It should be noted that the delimitations given earlier can represent a preliminary structural description. Whether that structure and its dynamics are adequate or relevant to describing the structure of individual cases is part of what further structural descriptions attempt to discover.

Consistent with trying to let the phenomenon speak for itself and ask its own questions of the reader/audience such that s/he can (re)create an experience, each account at the outset has its own contribution to  the phenomenon's structure and dynamics (see Giddens, 1993, p. 152; Moustakas, 1994, p. 9; Polkinghorne, 1988, p. 10). Trying to determine the structure of the phenomenon is a process of re-stating what happens in terms of parts and whole (see also Ricoeur, 1981/1995, p. 156). Validating and extending the preliminary description of structure may be one of the outcomes of this process. What carries the action and interactions? and how? How do they make for the textural experience (Bruner, 1987; McCall, 1990)? This questioning results in statements using the inquirer's terms for structure as well as the terms of the percipient. There is no assurance at the outset that individual structural descriptions will result in the same language, or borrow from other approaches to the phenomenon.

Composite textural and structural descriptions

Once the inquirer has draft individual textural and structural descriptions, s/he can combine them to offer a plausible insight into that which makes a thing what it is (Ihde, 1986, pp. 29-54; Moustakas, 1994, pp. 33-36, 122; van Manen, 1984, p. 38). These are first, composite textural and structural descriptions. They are written by _accretion_. One starts with one and begins considering each account and  interpretations (narratization and structural descriptions). As the inquirer revises the first in light of succeeding texts, the composite descriptions should reflect and encompass what the percipients, including that of the inquirer, experience and express.

Combining the textural and structural is a two-part process. One is to return to the matrix to hold all of the aspects of the stories as instances of the phenomenon. Applying that matrix to all the accounts should again reveal the horizons of the phenomenon. The matrix then becomes a _taxonomy of the qualities and features, including dynamics, of the phenomenon_. The second is to create a textural-structural description. This descriptive understanding of the phenomenon is the object and conclusion of the inquiry.

Matrix of qualities and features

Developing the descriptive matrix involves taking the accounts plus themes and theme clusters plus the textural and structural descriptions and gleaning from them key words and phrases. These terms are then _de-contextualized_ from the specific instances and interpretations. In some cases, one has to find new words. They become points of further reduction and are called qualities and features of the experience (see also Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 92). These, then, are organized into the most general categories of account parts--beginning, middle, and end (see also Langellier, 1989). The matrix as a taxonomy of terms can be applied to each account to assess its own general descriptive utility. Then one can consider each account against each aspect that the renewed matrix holds. The anticipated result is that we can see in bolder relief the _invariant horizons of the phenomenon_.

The matrix is a framework to contain the partial universe of the phenomenon treated. It is also to see the qualities and features of the phenomenon in list-like and visual form. It is not so much an analytical exterior framework to be applied as one that the accounts under study articulate. It is _inductive rather than deductive_, _descriptive rather than prescriptive_ (Packer, 1985). It is a tool which allows determining what is and is not the phenomenon.

Textural-structural description

Creating a textural-structural description is a process of using all of the above--reductions and interpretations plus the accounts themselves--and coming up with a synthesis. This synthesis is a meta-descriptor for the what of experience (_noema_) and how it is experienced (_noesis_)(Ihde, 1986).

The whole process, from placing the texts into tables to positing a final synthesis, is an iterative and dialectical one, like a hermeneutic _spiral_ (Packer, 1985, p. 1091). Spiral is an apt word to describe the process of looking back to look forward.

As I draft each stage, I consider it against other work, reflections, and the accounts in order to ensure consistency in what and how I am experiencing and trying to describe (van Manen, 1984). I revisit each account many times to see if I am "getting it right," and to see if there is another aspect to what was said. In the end, when _that point of rest or sufficiency_ is reached, I synthesize what I know and feel the experience of the phenomenon to be (Mishler, 1979). To give that life, I can illustrate the phenomenon by referring to the taxonomy of qualities and features.

The product should be "the nature and significance of an experience in a hitherto unseen way" (van Manen, 1984, p. 43). This in the best of circumstances and execution is much like a poem of and about human experience which can inform not just the inquirer, but also us.

References

Bruner, J. (1987). Life as narrative. Social Research,  54, 11-22.

Cohen, M Z., & Omery, A. (1994). Schools of  phenomenology: Implications for research. In J.

Filmer, P., Phillipson, M., Silverman, D., & Walsh, D.  (1973). New directions in sociological theory. London: Collier-Macmillan.

Gadamer, H-G. (1988). On the circle of understanding.  In J. M. Connolly & T. Keutner (Eds.), Hermeneutics versus science? Three German views (pp. 68-78). Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre  Dame Press.

Giddens, A. (1993). New rules of sociological method:  A positive critique of interpretive sociologies (2nd ed.). Stanford, CA: Stanford University  Press.

Husserl, E. (1931/1962). Ideas: General introduction  to pure phenomenology. New York: Macmillan.

Husserl, E. (1950/1995). Cartesian meditations: An  introduction to phenomenology. Dordrecht,  Netherlands: Kluwer.

Ihde, D. (1986). Experimental phenomenology. Albany:  State University of New York.

Kvale, S. (1983). The qualitative research interview:  A phenomenological and hermeneutical mode of  understanding. Journal of Phenomenological  Psychology 14(2), 171-196.

Langellier, K. M. (1989). Personal narratives:  Perspectives on theory and research. Text and Performance Quarterly, 9(4), 243-276.

Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985). Naturalistic  inquiry. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications.

McCall, M. M. (1990). The significance of  storytelling. Studies in Symbolic Interaction,  11, 145-161.

Miles, M. B., & Huberman, A. M. (1994). Qualitative  data analysis: An expanded sourcebook (2nd ed.).  Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Mishler, E. G. (1979). Meaning in context: Is there  any other kind? Harvard Educational Review,  49(1), 1-19.

Mishler, E. G. (1990). Validation in inquiry-guided  research: The role of exemplars in narrative  studies. Harvard Educational Review, 60(4), 415-442.

Moustakas, C. (1994). Phenomenological research  methods. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Packer, M. J. (1985). Hermeneutic inquiry in the study  of human conduct. American Psychologist, 43, 1081-1093.

Paget, M. A. (1983). Experience and knowledge. Human  Studies 6, 67-90.

Paget, M. A. (1990a). Life mirrors work mirrors text  mirrors life. . . . Social Problems, 37(2), 137-148.

Paget, M. A. (1990b). Unlearning to not speak. Human  Studies, 13, 147-161.

Palmer, R. E. (1969). Hermeneutics: Interpretation  theory in Schliermacher, Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University.

Patrik, L. E. (1994). Phenomenological method and  meditation. Journal of Transpersonal Psychology,  26(1), 37-54.

Polkinghorne, D. (1988). Narrative knowing and the  human sciences. Albany: State University of New  York.

Polyani, L. (1981). What stories can tell us about  their teller's world. Poetics Today, 2(2), 97-112.

Ray, M. A. (1994). The richness of phenomenology:  Philosophic, theoretic, and methodologic concerns, In J. M. Morse (Ed.), Critical issues  in qualitative research (pp. 117-133). Thousand  Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Ricoeur, P. (1981/1995). Hermeneutics and the human  sciences. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1990). Basics of  qualitative research: Grounded theory procedures  and techniques. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage  Publications.

van Manen, M. (1984). Practicing phenomenological  writing. Phenomenology and Pedagogy, 2(1), 36-69.

van Manen, M. (1990). Researching lived experience:  Human science for an action sensitive pedagogy. New York: State University of New York.

Wertz, F. J. (1983). From everyday to psychological  description: Analyzing the moments of a qualitative data analysis. Journal of  Phenomenological Psychology 14, 197-241.